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PERESTROIKA AFRICAN STYLE:
ONE-PARTY GOVERNMENT AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN TANZANIA
John Quigley*
INTRODUCTION
A new wave is sweeping Africa.' Constitutional systems that have
long been controlled by a single political party are opening to allow
participation by other parties. The wave hit with remarkable sudden-
ness in 1990, as monopoly parties across the continent made moves in
the direction of political pluralism. This article explores Africa's reex-
amination of one-party rule, focusing on the East African State of
Tanzania.2 It reviews the reasons for one-party rule as it developed
after independence, and the extent to which one-party rule permitted
political participation by the citizenry. The article then discusses the
reconsideration of one-party rule since 1990 and the arguments that
emerged for and against it in the public debate.
The one-party systems in Africa have drawn negative reactions
from Western States that provide economic aid. The article assesses
the one-party system in light of international human rights law and
asks whether aid-giving States must consider whether one-party rule
in recipient States violates international standards. In this connection,
the article asks whether the rights of association and political freedom
as developed in Europe can fairly be applied to Africa, given its histor-
ical experience.
Tanzania is an appropriate object of the study because in the 1960s
its leader, Julius Nyerere, was the most articulate proponent of one-
party rule on the continent. Nyerere shepherded the legislation that
brought one-party rule to Tanzania, making eloquent arguments in its
* Professor, Ohio State University College of Law. Harvard University LL.B., M.A. (1966).
The author expresses appreciation to Nancy Dorsey, Ph.D. candidate in African Studies, Ohio
State University, and a Fulbright scholar in Tanzania 1990-91, for source material and insights
on African history, and for reading a draft of this article. He is grateful for consultation to
members of the Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, and particularly to Dr. N.N.N.
Nditi, Editor of the Eastern Africa Law Review, for making available articles in progress.
1. "Africa" in this article refers to sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa. Although
North Africa is not covered, it is experiencing many of the same changes discussed in this article.
2. The name "Tanzania" was devised in 1964, as a combination of "Tanganyika" and "Zan-
zibar," after those two territories merged in that year to form the United Republic of Tanzania.
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support. As an elder statesman in 1990, however, Nyerere said that
the question should be reexamined, thereby initiating a public debate.
I. THE COLONIAL LEGACY
When colonialism ended in Africa in the 1960s, the newly in-
dependent States faced a difficult decision in determining what kind of
political system to adopt. The precolonial nations of Africa were ruled
by chiefs, typically advised by a council of elders who had a voice in
policy and injected a democratic element into decision-making. The
councils sometimes virtually amounted to legislatures. 3 In some cases,
particularly in West Africa, these nations were quite large.
This was not true, however, in the territory that would become
Tanganyika, and eventually Tanzania. This territory included the
lands of 120 nationalities, 4 and even within a single nationality typi-
cally there was no central authority. 5 Thus, the decision-making unit
was small, facilitating citizen participation.
In a military campaign, Germany conquered this territory in the
1880s and named it German East Africa.6 Drawing borders by agree-
ment with other European powers, Germany created a colonial State
where none had existed, thrusting nationalities together and splitting
many of their lands between German East Africa and newly created
neighboring colonies. 7 During World War I, Great Britain took Ger-
man East Africa, renamed it Tanganyika, and secured authority from
the League of Nations to administer it under a mandate arrangement
that involved a degree of international accountability.8
To govern Tanganyika, the British brought in their own adminis-
trators who served as executive and judicial officers. A governor-gen-
eral sat at the top of the hierarchy. Instead of trying to handle all
3. T. OLAWALE ELIAS, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA 19, 220 (1963) [hereinafter
ELIAS, POLITICS]; T. OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 193-205
(1956).
4. Margaret L. Bates, Tanganyika, in AFRICAN ONE-PARTY STATES 395, 433 (Gwendolen
M. Carter ed., 1962); Lionel Cliffe, The Political System, in ONE PARTY DEMOCRACY: THE 1965
TANZANIA GENERAL ELECTIONS 1, 3 (Lionel Cliffe ed., 1967).
5. Bates, supra note 4, at 398. A British survey in 1927 showed 679 chiefs. Id. at 406-07.
6. JOHN ILIFFE, A MODERN HISTORY OF TANGANYIKA 88-122 (1979); see Bates, supra note
4, at 400.
7. See, e.g., General Act of the Conference at Berlin, Feb. 26, 1885, 17 HERTSLET'S COM-
MERCIAL TREATIES 62 (1890).
8. British Mandate for East Africa (Tanganyika Territory), League of Nations Doc.
C.449(1)a.M.345(a).1922.VI, in TERMS OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES, U.N. Doc. A/70
(1946); see generally LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22 (discussing the general nature of a
mandate arrangement). When the United Nations was formed, Britain concluded a trusteeship
agreement with it to replace the mandate. Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Tangany-
ika, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 5, at 9 (1946).
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local administration with British officials, the governor relied on the
chiefs, who assumed the role of intermediaries with the population, in
a system that came to be called "indirect rule."9 While this procedure
used the existing political order to a certain extent and reduced the
level of outside intervention in everyday affairs, it deprived the chiefs
of autonomy by turning them into an arm of the British crown. 10
Eventually, the chiefs came to be regarded as front men for the gover-
nor, and they lost the respect that had been the base of their
authority. I I
Germans and Britons settled in Tanganyika, and, to give them a
role in governance, the British government created an Executive
Council in 1920 to advise the administration and a Legislative Council
in 1926 to debate proposals for new enactments, also on an advisory
basis only. Later, as the British administration was pressed to grant
self-determination, it appointed Africans to the Legislative Council in
1945 and to the Executive Council in 1951.12 The governor, however,
retained decision-making authority.' 3
The British administration set up a legal system that in many ways
was modeled on Britain's, but it used the law to gain access to Tan-
ganyika's resources and labor. It initiated a head tax less to gain reve-
nue than to force Africans to work on plantations. In order to pay the
tax, an African had to leave subsistence farming and enter the money
economy.14 African families were forbidden to live with a worker in
plantation housing, and if they did they might be arrested for trespass.
A worker who left a plantation was guilty of a criminal offense. Thus,
for plantation workers the law meant virtual servitude. An African
who did not pay the tax could be conscripted into a labor gang. So
many Africans were conscripted that the British administration con-
structed hundreds of miles of roads with forced labor.' 5
9. ILIFFE, supra note 6, at 318-25; Emile A.B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, Chiefs and Afri-
can States: Some Introductory Notes and an Extensive Bibliography on African Chieftaincy, 25 &
26 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 9-14 (1987); ELIAS, POLITICS, supra note 3, at 24-
27; Bates, supra note 4, at 405-06.
10. ILIFFE, supra note 6, at 319-20; Bates, supra note 4, at 409-10.
11. Bates, supra note 4, at 407.
12. ILIFFE, supra note 6, at 475.
13. Y.P. Ghai, Constitutions and the Political Order in East Africa, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
403, 406-09 (1972).
14. Issa G. Shivji, Law in Independent Africa: Some Reflections on the Role of Legal Ideology,
46 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 690-91 (1985); David V. Williams, State Coercion Against Peasant Farm-
ers: The Tanzanian Case, 20 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 95, 109 (1982); see also
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Development and the Legal Process in Kenya: An Analysis of the Role of
Law in Rural Development Administration, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 59, 63 (1984) (on similar laws
adopted for this same purpose by Britain in Kenya).
15." ISSA G. SHIVJI, LAW, STATE AND THE WORKING CLASS IN TANZANIA 9 (1986).
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As elsewhere on the continent, Africans in Tanganyika came to
independence in the 1960s in an artificially constituted State where
they had been denied a role in governance and had been subjected to a
legal system designed to gain their submission. Like other departing
colonial powers in Africa, Britain drafted for Tanganyika a constitu-
tion embodying a parliamentary form of government. 16 Britain's mo-
tive may have been to protect the European minority it was leaving
behind, as suspected by African leaders, rather than to promote de-
mocracy. But whatever the reason, the parliamentary model was ac-
cepted by the nationalist movements as a condition of gaining
independence. 17
II. THE REASONS AND RATIONALE FOR THE ONE-PARTY
APPROACH
Administrators in newly independent States were reluctant to ac-
cept a parliamentary process proposed by a colonial power that the
colonial power had not itself applied prior to independence. However,
if the parliamentary system held no luster, there was little else avail-
able as an obvious mode of governance. The traditional system of
chiefs advised by a council was not appropriate because the new States
included many nationalities.' 8 After independence, moreover, many
African politicians viewed the chiefs as rival sources of power and
were reluctant to rely on them to rule even in their own localities. 19
Committed to retaining the territories as defined by the colonizing
powers, the new governments viewed rivalry among the nationalities
as a threat. 20 Seeking to suppress nationality divisions, the Tangan-
yika Parliament abolished the institution of the chief in 1963.21
In regard to nationalities, Tanganyika was in a more advantageous
position than other African States because with so many nationalities
none could dominate the others. A few were more advanced commer-
cially, but their populations were small. Also, the largest nationality
16. In Tanganyika as elsewhere, the fact that the colonizing power drafted the constitution
put it under a cloud of illegitimacy. Kivutha Kibwana, Issues of Constitutional Reform in Africa:
The Example of Kenya, NAIROBI L. MONTHLY, June 1991, at 31, 33.
17. See Ghai, supra note 13, at 412.
18. See R.W. Tenga, The Historical and Socio-Economic Approaches in Learning the Law:
Dar es Salaam and 3rd World Perspectives in Jurisprudence, in LIMITS OF LEGAL RADICALISM
95, 105 (Issa G. Shivji ed., 1986).
19. van Nieuwaal, supra note 9, at 3-4.
20. Simbi V. Mubako, Zambia's Single-Party Constitution - A Search for Unity and Develop-
ment, 5 ZAMBIA L.J. 67, 83 (1973) ("Tribalism has indeed played a largely divisive role in Zam-
bian politics.").
21. African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) Act, No. 13 of 1963, TANGANYIKA REVISED LAWS
Cap. 517 - Supp. 63, at 3.
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numbered only slightly over ten percent of the total population. In
African States with one or two predominant nationalities, like Ethio-
pia, Zimbabwe, or Kenya, the threat that politics would divide on na-
tionality lines was more serious. Nonetheless, there was concern in
Tanganyika that political parties might represent nationalities rather
than policies and thus detract from State-building.22
In Tanganyika, as in most of Africa, the political movement that
led the anticolonial effort assumed power. In Tanganyika this move-
ment was the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). In the
legislative assembly elected in 1960 to pave the way for independence,
there were seventy-one seats, of which TANU won fifty-eight unop-
posed and twelve others in contested races. The United Tanganyika
Party, which was oriented to the European population, won only one
seat, and the African National Congress, a breakaway party from
TANU, won none.23 In the presidential election of 1962 that brought
Nyerere to the new post of president, the African National Congress,
the only other party to field a candidate, received less than two percent
of the vote.24
In 1963, TANU proposed that the other parties be excluded by
law. This move led Chief Abdallah Fundikira, the Minister of Justice
and a TANU member, to resign in protest. 25 A one-party system,
TANU officials said, would be closer to the traditional mode of gov-
ernance where consensus was reached by discussion. Thrashing out
differences within a single party was closer to that process, TANU
leaders said, than a system in which competing parties pursue their
own agendas. 26
22. Pius Msekwa, The Doctrine of the One-Party State in Relation to Human Rights and the
Rule of Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE-PARTY STATE 21, 24-25 (International Commission
of Jurists, International Seminar on Human Rights, Their Protection and the Rule of Law in a
One-Party State, 1976).
23. Bates, supra note 4, at 430; Kibuta Ong'wamuhana, Party Supremacy and the State Con-
stitution in Africa's One-Party States: The Kenya-Tanzania Experience, 1988 THIRD WORLD
LEGAL STUD. 77, 83.
24. Kibuta, supra note 23, at 83. Nyerere received 1,127,652 votes, against 21,311 for the
candidate of the African National Congress. Bates, supra note 4, at 423.
25. Umesh Kumar, Some Preliminary Observations on the Administration of Justice in a One
Party African State: The Tanzanian Experience, 1 LESOTHO L.J. 119, 122 (1986); Richard
Dowden, Nyerere's Old Enemy Feels His Time Has Come, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 8,
1991, at 8 (giving text of 1963 Fundikira letter of resignation).
26. JULIUS K. NYERERE, DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 1-2 (1962) [hereinafter
NYERERE, DEMOCRACY]. Substantial excerpts of this pamphlet appear in JULIUS K. NYERERE,
FREEDOM AND UNITY: UHURU NA UMOJA: A SELECTION FROM WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
1952-1965, at 195-96 (1967); CRANFORD PRATT, THE CRITICAL PHASE IN TANZANIA 1945-
1968, at 202 (1976); Ghai, supra note 13, at 415. A contrary argument is made that the tradi-
tional consensus-seeking approach is more similar to multiparty politics, where differences must
be resolved, than to a one-party system, where, it is argued, differences are submerged through
the imposition of one viewpoint on dissenters. Baffour Ankomah, Why Africa Needs Democracy,
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As TANU chair, Julius Nyerere argued that the overwhelming
electoral support for TANU showed that the public did not under-
stand the notion of an opposition party.27 Further, Nyerere ques-
tioned whether a multiparty system was more democratic. He pointed
out that with multiple parties, parliamentary representatives are under
pressure to support their party, and thus cannot vote their conscience.
He said that if there is a single party, and if that party "is identified
with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer
than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each repre-
senting only a section of the community." 28
"A Two-Party system," Nyerere stated, "can be justified only
when the parties are divided over some fundamental issue; otherwise it
merely encourages the growth of factionalism. ' 29 If you have two par-
ties but no fundamental differences, "then you immediately reduce
politics to the level of a football match."' 30 If all agree on the major
needs of the society, he commented, it is better to have all the repre-
sentatives cooperating to achieve them, rather than jockeying for polit-
ical advantage.31
Nyerere argued that political parties in Africa were different from
parties in the West. "The European and American parties," he said,
came into being as the result of existing social and economic divisions -
the second party being formed to challenge the monopoly of political
power by some aristocratic or capitalist group. Our own parties had a
very different origin. They were not formed to challenge any ruling
group of our own people; they were formed to challenge the foreigners
who ruled over us. They were not, therefore, political "parties" i.e.,
factions but nationalist movements. And from the outset they repre-
sented the interests and aspirations of the whole nation. 32
In Tanganyika at independence, Nyerere said, there was "no monop-
oly of political power by any sectional group which could give rise to
conflicting parties. There can, therefore, be only one reason for the
formation of such parties in a country like ours the desire to imitate
the political structure of a totally dissimilar society." 33
NEW AFR., June 1991, at 10, 11; Christopher Mulei, Africa Needs Democracy, NEW AFR., June
1991, at 26.
27. NYERERE, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 4.
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id. at 9.
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id. at 14-15; see also Kibuta, supra note 23, at 77 (noting that while more than one party
emerged, they were united on the goal of independence and had little or no program for the
future, post-independence period).
33. NYERERE, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 15.
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A two-party system, according to Nyerere, had negative conse-
quences in the African post-independence context:
To try and import the idea of a parliamentary opposition into Africa
may very likely lead to violence because the opposition parties will tend
to be regarded as traitors by the majority of our people or at best, it will
lead to the trivial manoeuvring of "opposing" groups whose time is spent
in the inflation of artificial differences into some semblance of reality "for
the sake of preserving democracy"! 34
Moreover, with TANU candidates gaining overwhelming majori-
ties, the opposition, TANU leaders said, had little chance of winning.
Thus, the voters had little effective choice, and, indeed, would have
more choice if TANU were the only party because then they could
choose among TANU candidates. 35
For democracy under a one-party system, Nyerere said, party
membership must be open to all, and freedom of expression must be
assured. Then a one-party system could be more democratic, in the
African context, than a multiparty system. 36
Nyerere's contention that there were no societal divisions in the
African States at independence was questionable because of the exist-
ence of many nationalities in the country. It was also questionable
because European missionary activity and European-style education in
missionary and government schools had divided Tanzanians, as they
had other African societies. 37 Many Africans who were introduced to
the European world in secondary schools assumed a style of life that
separated them from their families. 38 A young woman in Tanganyika
who left her village to work in a city was regarded as immoral by the
villagers. In a nomadic society, a young man who moved to a town
instead of herding cattle like his peers was regarded as having failed to
do what was expected of him in life.
Although TANU enjoyed broad support in Tanganyika, its leaders
were educated and urbanized. 39 Many were graduates of so-called
"sons of chiefs" schools4° where they developed an identity that sepa-
rated them from other Tanganyikans. 41 They came to the indepen-
34. Id.
35. Msekwa, supra note 22, at 22.
36. NYERERE, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 23-24.
37. Majorie J. Mbilinyi, African Education during the British Colonial Period 1919-61, in
TANZANIA UNDER COLONIAL RULE 236 (M.H.Y. Kaniki ed., 1980); Msekwa, supra note 22, at
23.
38. See Bates, supra note 4, at 435.
39. See id. at 423.
40. The "sons of chiefs" schools are described in Mbilinyi, supra note 37, at 254.
41. Id. at 255.
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dence struggle from professional positions.42 In the civil service and
other salaried urban positions, a social class developed with a lifestyle
that set it apart from the peasantry and urban poor.43 The split be-
tween this class and the rest of society made consensus on major issues
difficult."4
Economic factors were an additional reason for one-party rule, as
African leaders stressed the need for economic independence to ac-
company political independence. Investment from companies of the
former metropolis remained a dominant factor in African econo-
mies.45 Concern that Europe remained in control created pressure for
firm central control as a counterbalance to the influence of these com-
panies.46 TANU advocated a strong executive government led by a
strong party.47 Its leaders said that economic development took prece-
dence over political development. 4  Political pluralism, they con-
tended, was an unnecessary, even dangerous, luxury. 49
The small opposition parties did not accept the TANU analysis but
called it a subterfuge for entrenching TANU leaders in comfortable
positions.50 While this judgment may be overstated, it contained a
kernel of truth. As time went on, TANU functionaries developed a
proprietary attitude towards their prerogatives and were not above us-
ing compulsion instead of persuasion against those who disagreed with
TANU policies.51 One-party rule helped those who came to power at
42. See, e.g., the analysis regarding Tanzania, in H.G. Mwakyembe, The Parliament and the
Electoral Process, in THE STATE AND THE WORKING PEOPLE IN TANZANIA 16, 32 (Issa G.
Shivji ed., 1985) (stating that with the attainment of political independence in 1961, the State
power in Tanganyika was "captured" by a petty bourgeois class comprised of trade union lead-
ers, small businessmen, cooperative activists, teachers, and other junior civil servants, because it
was the only one better placed and organized to mobilize the various strata of the population for
national self-determination).
43. OSITA C. EZE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: SOME SELECTED PROBLEMS 57 (1984);
PRATT, supra note 26, at 215-26; Bates, supra note 4, at 423 (stating that TANU leadership by
the mid-1950s "came mainly from commercial employees in the towns .... who were beginning
to constitute an African middle class").
44. See Leonard P. Shaidi, Crime, Justice and Politics in Contemporary Tanzania: State
Power in an Underdeveloped Social Formation, 17 INT'L J. Soc. L. 247, 248 (1989).
45. Samuel K.B. Asante, Restructuring Transnational Minerals Agreements, 73 AM. J. INT'L
L. 335 (1979).
46. N.S. Rembe, Prospects for the Realisation of the New International Economic Order.: An
African Perspective, 17 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 322, 326 (1984).
47. Mwakyembe, supra note 42, at 35.
48. ISSA G. SHIVJI, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 83 (1989).
49. EZE, supra note 43, at 57; Msekwa, supra note 22, at 31; Mubako, supra note 20, at 80;
Issa G. Shivji, State and Constitutionalism in Africa: A New Democratic Perspective, 18 INT'L J.
Soc. L. 381, 383 (1990).
50. EZE, supra note 43, at 57-58; Job Chacha, One-Party System 'Not Freely Chosen,' Bus.
TIMES (Dar es Salaam), May 17, 1991, at 4 (charging that the motive was to "monopolize the
intrinsic rewards of holding office").
51. EZE, supra note 43, at 58; PRATT, supra note 26, at 185.
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independence to retain their positions.52
III. THE OPERATION OF THE ONE-PARTY SYSTEM
For TANU's aim of outlawing opposition parties to be achieved,
constitutional change was required. The British-adopted 1961 Consti-
tution of Tanganyika did not mention political parties,5 3 nor did the
1963 Constitution of Zanzibar, which provided for a sultanate that
signified continued control by the Arab minority that had long ruled
Zanzibar.5 4 Two Arab-dominated parties won an election in Zanzibar
to form a government upon independence from Britain in January
1964. However, within a few weeks, that government was overthrown
by the African-dominated Afro-Shirazi Party. The Revolutionary
Council that assumed power declared Zanzibar a one-party State with
the Afro-Shirazi Party as the sole party. 55
In 1963, Nyerere, by then Tanganyika's President in addition to
TANU Chair, appointed a presidential commission to make recom-
mendations on how one-party rule could be implemented and specifi-
cally on how citizen participation could be ensured.56 By the time the
commission completed its work, Tanganyika and Zanzibar had
merged to form Tanzania. Following the publication of the commis-
sion's report, the first Constitution of Tanzania established one-party
rule. The 1965 Interim Constitution of Tanzania stated, "There shall
be one political Party in Tanzania. 57
Since at the time of union Zanzibar and Tanganyika each had a
predominant political party (the Afro-Shirazi Party and TANU, re-
spectively), the notion of a one-party State faced an obstacle. The In-
terim Constitution dealt with the issue in a provision that
contemplated an eventual merger between TANU and the Afro-
Shirazi Party, stating, "Until the union of the Tanganyika African Na-
tional Union with the Afro-Shirazi Party (which United Party shall
constitute the one political Party), the Party shall, in and for Tangany-
ika, be the Tanganyika African National Union and, in and for Zanzi-
52. PRATT, supra note 26, at 187-88.
53. TANGANYIKA CONST. (Tanganyika (Constitution) Order in Council, No. 2274 of 1961,
STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS 3988).
54. ZANZIBAR CONST. (1963) § 32 (reprinted in 72 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE ZANZIBAR
GOVERNMENT, Dec. 5, 1963 (Legal Supp., Pt. I at 49)).
55. Kibuta, supra note 23, at 83.
56. Y.P. Ghai & J.P.W.B. McAuslan, Constitutional Proposals for a One-Party State in
Tanzania, I E. AFR. L.J. 124 (1965).
57. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF TANZANIA, confirmed by An Act to Declare the Interim
Constitution of Tanzania, No. 43 of 1965, TANGANYIKA REVISED LAWS Cap. 596 - Supp. 65,
§ 3(1), reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF AFRICAN STATES 1517 (Asian-African Legal Consulta-
tive Committee, 1972) [hereinafter INTERIM CONSTITUTION].
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bar, be the Afro-Shirazi Party." 58 "All political activity in Tanzania,"
it went on,
other than that of the organs of State of the United Republic, the organs
of the Executive and Legislature for Zanzibar, or such local government
authorities as may be established by or under a law of the appropriate
legislative authority, shall be conducted by or under the auspices of the
Party.5 9
TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party did not immediately merge, and so
the mainland and Zanzibar functioned each with its own sole legal
party, the two deciding on policy through informal agreement.
On the mainland, once TANU became the only party, the Na-
tional Assembly, which previously had decided important issues of
policy, took a subordinate role to TANU's National Executive Com-
mittee.6° Members of the National Assembly, said TANU leaders,
were not to criticize National Executive Committee decisions, but only
to discuss their implementation. 6t
Although TANU originally deemed the judiciary a crucial factor
in maintaining the rule of law under the one-party system, 62 many
claimants looked to TANU to resolve disputes, 63 and TANU, defacto,
assumed power from the judiciary. 64
The one-party system brought about a significant concentration of
power.65 TANU abolished independent trade unions, forcing workers
to organize through a single union that it controlled. 66 It also estab-
lished control of a powerful rural network of marketing coopera-
tives.67 Nyerere's comment that opposition parties were viewed as
traitors was indicative, 68 because after independence TANU leaders
58. Id. § 3(2).
59. Id. § 3(3).
60. Ghai, supra note 13, at 421.
61. ROBERT MARTIN, PERSONAL FREEDOM AND THE LAW IN TANZANIA 52 (1974).
62. Msekwa, supra note 22, at 33-34 (citing presidential commission that recommended one-
party system because courts must not be influenced by political considerations in dispensing
justice).
63. Shivji, supra note 49, at 385.
64. Yash P. Ghai, Legal Radicalism, Professionalism and Social Action: Reflections on Teach-
ing Law in Dar es Salaam, in LIMITS OF LEGAL RADICALISM, supra note 18, at 26, 29.
65. Id. at 32; Ghai, supra note 13, at 433.
66. National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act, No. 18 of 1964, TANGANY-
IKA REVISED LAWS Cap. 555 - Supp. 64, First Schedule § 3(2) ("The Union shall become affili-
ated to the Tanganyika African National Union and shall do everything in its power to promote
the policies of the Tanganyika African National Union."); PRATT, supra note 26, at 189-91;
Wilbert B.L. Kapinga, State Control of the Working Class Through Labour Legislation, in THE
STATE AND THE WORKING PEOPLE IN TANZANIA, supra note 42, at 87, 88-91.
67. PRATr, supra note 26, at 191-93.
68. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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regarded opposition elements as subversive. 69 Using a 1921 statute,
the Deportation Ordinance, which the British administration had en-
acted to move pro-independence activists from one part of Tanganyika
to another, 70 Nyerere transferred political opponents away from their
bases of support. 7'
TANU also secured the passage by the National Assembly of the
Preventive Detention Act, which gave the President the power to de-
tain indefinitely any person he deemed dangerous to good order.72
This statute allowed Nyerere to incarcerate persons who opposed
TANU, including persons who had been prominent in smaller parties
that were rendered illegal by the establishment of a one-party sys-
tem.73 Detainees had no procedure available to them to challenge a
detention, and the courts had no jurisdiction to question a detention
order.74 The Preventive Detention Act deterred political activity
outside established channels. 75
In 1977, TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party merged to form the
Revolutionary Party, generally called by its Swahili-language name,
Chama cha Mapinduzi, and a new Constitution reaffirming the Party's
monopoly was adopted for Tanzania. "Chama cha Mapinduzi (in
short CCM)," the Constitution said, "shall be the sole political party
in Tanzania having supremacy in accordance with its Constitution. '76
"All political activities in Tanzania," it stated, "shall be conducted by
or under the auspices of the Party, ' 77 and, "all activities of the organs
of state of the United Republic of Tanzania shall be conducted under
69. PRATT, supra note 26, at 188.
70. An Ordinance to Make Provision for the Deportation of Certain Persons from One Part
of the Territory to Another, No. 18 of 1921, TANGANYIKA REVISED LAWS Cap. 38 - Supp. 58.
71. PRATT, supra note 26, at 187; Chris M. Peter, Respect for Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms: A New Bill of Rights for Tanzania, 67 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE SCI-
ENCES DIPLOMATIQUES ET POLITIQUES 255, 266-67 (1989); M.K.B. Wambali, Freedom of
Movement Under the Tanzania Constitution: Some Operational Observations, 17 E. AFR. L. REV.
(1990).
72. An Act to Provide for Preventive Detention, No. 60 of 1962, TANGANYIKA REVISED
LAWS Cap. 490 - Supp. 62 [hereinafter Preventive Detention Act].
73. Dowden, supra note 25, at 8 (detention of opposition leaders); Msekwa, supra note 22, at
25; see generally Martin, supra note 61, at 91-93.
74. See Preventive Detention Act, supra note 72, § 3 ("No order made under this Act shall
be questioned in any court"); see generally L.T. Kalunga, Human Rights and the Preventive
Detention Act of 1962 of the United Republic of Tanzania: Some Operative Aspects, 11-14 E. AFR.
L. REV. 281 (1978-81); MARTIN, supra note 61, at 8-9; John Quigley, Cases on Preventive Deten-
tion: A Review, 11-14 E. AFR. L. REV. 326 (1978-81).
75. See generally K.S.K. Lugakingira, Personal Liberty and Judicial Attitude: The Tanzanian
Case, 17 E. AFR. L. REV. (1990).
76. TANZ. CONST. § 3(1) (amended 1977), reprinted in 29 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF THE WORLD: HISTORIC CONSTITUTIONS (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.,
1979).
77. Id. § 3(2).
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the auspices of the Party."'78
The Constitution said that
in accordance with the provisions of section 59(11) of the Constitution of
the Party, the National Assembly shall constitute a Committee of the
National Conference of the Party, whose functions shall be to supervise
generally the activities of the Government and of the various public or-
ganisations in implementing the policy of the Party. 79
Thus, the National Assembly became formally subordinated to the
CCM.8 0
The CCM closely controlled nominations of candidates to the Na-
tional Assembly. To be nominated, a person had to be approved by
the CCM National Executive Committee, following selection by a
CCM district conference, 81 and according to the CCM's own constitu-
tion, only CCM members could be approved. 82 Individuals who were
critical of CCM policy stood little chance of being endorsed. 3
The CCM has typically nominated two persons for each seat.84 On
the ballot it designates one of them with a hoe symbol, and the other
with a house symbol. It came to be understood that those designated
by the hoe were favored by the CCM. 85 The election campaigns are
organized by the CCM.8 6 Since all candidates must adhere to CCM
policy, electoral campaigns do not feature differences of opinion on
major issues. 87
A losing candidate who thinks that electoral procedures were not
carried out according to law may complain to the electoral commis-
sion.88 From there the candidate seeks judicial remedies, 89 except that
78. Id. § 3(3).
79. Id. § 54(l).
80. Kibuta, supra note 23, at 87.
81. TANZ. CONST. (1977), amended by Act No. 15 of 1984, § 77(2)(b), reprinted in 19 CON-
STITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.,
1987) [hereinafter 1984 TANZ. CONST.]; Elections Act, No. I of 1985, TANZANIA REVISED
LAWS Supp. 85-90, § 43; Immanuel Bavu, Election Management and Democracy, in TANZANIA:
DEMOCRACY IN TRANSITION 22, 26 (Haroub Othman et al. eds., 1990); Peter, supra note 71, at
277.
82. CCM Const. § 26(2).
83. Peter, supra note 71, at 277.
84. Bavu, supra note 81, at 23-25. In addition to elected members, the National Assembly
includes the regional commissioners of each region of Tanzania, plus a number of members ap-
pointed by the president or by designated "mass organizations." 1984 TANZ. CONST., supra note
81, §§ 66, 78-82; see also PRATT, supra note 26, at 206-07.
85. Bavu, supra note 81, at 30-31; Mwakyembe, supra note 42, at 40-41.
86. Election Act, supra note 81, § 51.
87. See PRATT, supra note 26, at 207.
88. Elections Act, supra note 81, § 108; N. Issa, 'Legal Touch' on Natural Justice Sensa-
tional, Bus. TIMES (Dares Salaam), May 31, 1991, at 5 (secretary of electoral commission replies
to charge by Robert Rweyemamu, Business Times legal editor, that commission turns down
petitions of losing candidates on technicalities).
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there is no court jurisdiction over the CCM proceedings that led to the
nominations. 90 Once elected, a member of the National Assembly re-
mains subject to CCM control in that a member will lose his seat if
removed from CCM membership while in office. 91 A number of mem-
bers have lost their seats in this fashion.92
Although not required by the Constitution, the practice has been
for the CCM chair to be president of Tanzania as well.93 Thus, the
president may be expected to pursue CCM policy in his role as presi-
dent. The Constitution, in fact, requires him to do so, specifying that
the president must carry out the Constitution, the laws, "and the phi-
losophy and guidelines of the party."' 94 If a president were expelled
from the CCM, he would be disqualified as president, since the Consti-
tution specifies that a president must satisfy the qualifications for elec-
tion to parliament,95 and election to parliament requires CCM
membership.96 If a sitting president were to be disqualified, a new
presidential election would be held.97
One aspect of the CCM role that has engendered negative reaction
from the public in Tanzania is the annual subventions that the Na-
tional Assembly vote for the CCM in the amount of two percent of
total revenues. 98 This policy has been criticized on the grounds that
the Constitution requires the National Assembly to allocate govern-
ment revenue for governmental purposes only99 and that taxpayer
89. Elections Act, supra note 81, § 11; see also Attorney General v. Monko, Law Reports of
the Commonwealth: Constitutional and Administrative Law Reports 211 (Tanzania Court of
Appeal) (1989) (High Court and Court of Appeal of Tanzania nullifying an election upon com-
plaint of a losing candidate on grounds that counting was done not by the appropriate officials,
but by secondary school students under the observation of those officials, and because the count-
ing was done from each ballot box separately, rather than by mixing all the ballots together and
then counting; both practices were found to violate Elections Act).
90. Elections Act, supra note 81, § 108(2); Kibuta, supra note 23, at 88 (stating that the
nomination procedure is more critical than the election procedure, thus that a losing candidate
has no court challenge for the stage where irregularities are more likely to affect the outcome).
91. 1984 TANZ. CONST., supra note 81, §§ 67(l)(b), 71(l)(a); see MARTIN, supra note 61, at
52; Kibuta, supra note 23, at 87 (nine National Assembly members who had criticized TANU
policy were deprived of TANU membership in 1968, thus losing their seats).
92. PRATT, supra note 26, at 209; Chacha, supra note 50, at 4; G. Mgongo Fimbo, CCM and
the Executive in Tanzania's Constitutional Structure, 17 E. AFR. L. REv. (1990).
93. Until 1985, Nyerere held both posts. When he resigned as president in 1985, Mwinyi,
then-vice-chair of CCM, was nominated and elected president, and in 1990 became CCM chair,
when Nyerere resigned that post. Neil Henry, Nyerere Bows Out with Tanzania in Deep Decline,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 26, 1990, at A27.
94. 1984 TANZ. CONST., supra note 81, § 37(1).
95. Id. § 39(l)(b).
96. Id. § 67(l)(b).
97. Id. § 38(2)(c); see Fimbo, supra note 92.
98. Fimbo, supra note 92.
99. 1984 TANZ. CONST., supra note 81, §§ 133-34; Fimbo, supra note 92.
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funds should not go to a nominally private organization. 10
The one-party monopoly system was reaffirmed again in Tanzania
in the Constitution as extensively amended in 1984: "(1) The Union
Republic is a democratic and socialist nation with one political party.
(2) The party exercises executive powers over all matters in accord-
ance with the Constitution and the Constitution of the Party. (3) The
Revolutionary Party, in short 'CCM', is the only political party in the
United Republic." 101
Also in 1984, a bill of rights was written into the Constitution for
the first time. It gave every individual the right "to establish or join a
party or organisations established with the objectives of maintaining
and promoting his Faith or his interests or other interests."' 0 2 An-
other rights provision concerned participation in public affairs:
(1) Every citizen of the Union Republic has a right to participate in the
affairs of governing the country, either directly or through officials
elected voluntarily by the people in accordance with laid down guide-
lines and laws. (2) Every citizen has the right and freedom to partici-
pate fully in the process of decision-making on matters affecting him, his
life and those affecting the nation. 103
The freedom of association and the right to participate in public
affairs were, however, not viewed by the CCM as being incompatible
with the exclusion of other political parties. The Constitution referred
to Tanzania as democratic in the very sentence that called for a single
political party. 0 4 Political discussion was confined within the party,
but that did not mean there was no debate. Indeed, if a single party is
sufficiently inclusive, and sufficiently general in its goals, it may pro-
vide a forum for wide-ranging debate. A single party does not neces-
sarily mean authoritarianism. The level of democracy in a single-party
system depends on the amount of openness and accountability in the
processes of that party. It has been suggested that in a single-party
system the party needs to be regulated just as government officials are
regulated, in order to keep it from oppressing the population. 0 5
To a certain degree, the CCM provided a forum for debate. Its
goal was economic development, a goal widely shared in Tanzania.
Membership was open to any Tanzanian who wanted to join, so that
100. Chacha, supra note 50, at 4.
101. 1984 TANZ. CONST., supra note 81, § 3.
102. Id. § 20(1).
103. Id. § 21.
104. Id. § 3(1).
105. Fimbo, supra note 92; J.B. Ojwang & Phoebe N. Okowa, The One-Party State and Due
Process of Law." The Kenya Case in Comparative Perspective, I AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 177
(1989).
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the CCM was not an exclusive club. 10 6 CCM policy was to be made
by the National Conference, meeting every five years, but the National
Executive Committee made the important decisions, which would
then be endorsed without significant discussion by the National Con-
ference. 10 7 This practice reduced the level of democracy within the
CCM. One critic called the one-party system in Tanzania "an ideolog-
ical fig-leaf to cover authoritarianism."' 10 8
Although some analysts found the operation of the parliament to
reflect democratic practice, 10 9 National Assembly members took little
initiative and typically followed the lead of the CCM leadership. 110
While the CCM was not overly strict in its ideological require-
ments, I ' and typically its National Executive Committee approved
potential candidates who had the backing of the local party, 1 2 still the
electoral system did not produce an independent-minded
parliament. 113
By the 1980s, nearly all African States had instituted a one-party
system.'14 In a few instances, court challenges were made to one-
106. INTERIM CONSTITUTION, supra note 57, § 5. About three million of Tanzania's 25
million residents are CCM members. Kibuta, supra note 23, at 96.
107. Kumar, supra note 25, at 127-28.
108. SHIVJI, supra note 48, at 58; see also P. Anyang' Nyong'o, A Continent Awakens to
Pluralism and Hope, WorldPaper, Aug. 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WPAPER File
(arguing that Tanzania's one-party system did not achieve the ends Nyerere said it would).
109. EZE, supra note 43, at 58-59.
110. See ALl MAZRUI, CULTURAL ENGINEERING AND NATION-BUILDING IN EAST AFRICA
128 (1972).
111. PRATt, supra note 26, at 205.
112. Kumar, supra note 25, at 129.
113. PRATT, supra note 26, at 208-09.
114. MAZRUI, supra note 110, at 111-25; Lawrence Zimba, The Origins and Spread of One-
Party States in Commonwealth Africa, Their Impact on Personal Liberties: A Case Study of the
Zambian Model, in LAW IN ZAMBIA 113, 114 (Muna Ndulo ed., 1984); see, e.g., ZAIRE CONST.
(1982) tit. III, art. 32, reprinted in 19 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,
supra note 81 ("In the Republic of Zaire, there is only one institution, the Popular Movement of
the Revolution."), art. 33 ("The Popular Movement of the Revolution is the Zairean Nation
organized politically.... Every Zairean is a member of the Popular Movement of the Revolu-
tion."), art. 36 ("The President of the Popular Movement of the Revolution is by law President
of the Republic."); BURUNDI CONST. (1981) tit. III, art. 22, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 81 ("The Republic of Burundi adopts the principle
of the one mass party, called 'Union for National Progress' (UPRONA)."), art. 26 ("The Na-
tional Congress is the supreme instance of the party."), art. 29 ("The President of the Uprona
Party is the only candidate for the presidency of the Republic."); ZAMBIA CONST. (An Act to
Enact a New Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, Aug. 25, 1973) pt. I, § 4(1), reprinted in 19
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 81 ("There shall be one and
only one political party or organisation in Zambia, namely, the United National Independence
Party."), § 4(2) ("Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be so construed as to entitle any
person lawfully to form or attempt to form any political party or organisation other than the
Party, or to belong to, assemble or associate with, or express opinion or do any other thing in
sympathy with, such political party or organisation."); SIERRA LEONE CONST. (Act. No. 12 of
1978) ch. I, § 4, reprinted in 19 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note
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party systems on the grounds that they violated the freedom of associ-
ation, but none of these challenges was successful.115
The one-party system held firm in Tanzania into the 1980s, despite
the passage of the bill of rights in 1984. The government continued to
suppress those who advocated pluralism. A man, who in the 1980s
initiated a campaign that resulted in 300,000 signatures on a petition
for a multiparty system, was held in preventive detention for eighteen
months and under the Deportation Ordinance was banished for one
year to an offshore island.' 16
In the 1980s, the CCM lost some of its legal base for stopping op-
ponents. In 1985, the Preventive Detention Act was amended to au-
thorize the High Court to entertain a challenge to the legality of the
order "on any ground." 117 Although the president could still jail
political opponents for nebulous reasons, his decision was no longer
unreviewable. 118 In 1988, a High Court judge held the Deportation
Ordinance invalid by finding it inconsistent with the constitutional
right to freedom of movement."19 The Court of Appeal, Tanzania's
highest tribunal, returned the case for further fact-finding but without
disapproving the High Court's decision.' 20
81 ("The One Party recognised shall be such as shall be prescribed by Parliament by a resolution
adopted by at least two-thirds of the Members of Parliament."), ch. III, § 22 (president must be a
member of that party), ch. IV, pt. II, § 44 (members of parliament must be members of that
party). The only States operating under party pluralism were Botswana, Senegal, Gambia, and
Zimbabwe, although even in those States a single party in fact predominated. Rodger M.A.
Chongwe, Acceptance of the Role of Law and Lawyers in Africa, 2 AFR. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 479,
481 n.7 (1990).
115. When the Sierra Leone government initiated a study of the feasibility of establishing a
one-party system, a group of citizens sued, but the case was dismissed on the grounds that they
had not proved injury to themselves. Steele v. Attorney General, 1967-68 ALR S.L. 1, reprinted
in A. MILNER ET AL., LEADING CASES IN SIERRA LEONE 111 (1975). In Zambia, two potential
presidential candidates not of the official party sued, arguing that the one-party system abridged
the freedom of association. The High Court, however, in a decision affirmed by the Supreme
Court, said that the applicants lacked standing to bring the action. Nkumbula v. Attorney-
General (1972), explained in 6 ANN. SURV. AFR. L. 172 (1972), noted in Chandra P. Gupta,
Harry Mwanga Nkumbula and Attorney General for the Republic of Zambia, 5 ZAMBIA L.J. 147
(1973), discussed in Zimba, supra note 114, at 121-26.
116. See Neil Henry, Daring to Differ in Tanzania, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1990, at A23
(deportation of James Mapalala, founder of the Civil and Human Rights Movement of
Tanzania); Peter, supra note 71, at 273-74; Tanzania, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Mar. 1987, at 40
(detention of Mapalala under Preventive Detention Act, presumably for his campaigning for
repeal of one-party rule).
117. An Act to Amend the Preventive Detention Act, No. 2 of 1985, TANZANIA REVISED
LAWS § 5.
118. Dissolve Union Cabinet - Seminar, DAILY NEWS (Dares Salaam), June 13, 1991, at 5.
119. Chumchua s/o Marwa v. Officer i/c of Musoma Prison and the Attorney General, High
Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Misc. Crim. Cause No. 2 of 1988 (Mwalusanya, J.).
120. Chris M. Peter, Five Years of Bill of Rights in Tanzania: Drawing a Balance-Sheet, 18
E. AFR. L. REV. (1991).
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IV. AN AFRICAN PERESTROIKA
In 1990, all over Africa, public demand grew for an end to one-
party rule.121 In a number of States, crowds pressed for a national
conference to plot a course to pluralism. 122 One by one, governments
made concessions. Gabon held its first multiparty parliamentary elec-
tions. 123 The Ivory Coast, following large demonstrations, held its
first multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections. 124  Togo's
President, also following pro-pluralism rallies, agreed to a revision of
the Togolese Constitution to permit a multiparty system, and a consti-
tutional referendum was scheduled. 125 Mozambique's National As-
sembly unanimously approved constitutional amendments establishing
a multiparty system.' 26 In the Congo (Brazzaville), as a result of rec-
ommendations made by a national conference, the government sched-
uled multiparty elections for 1992.127 The President of Zimbabwe,
Robert Mugabe, who had long advocated the institution of one-party
rule, gave up his quest and pledged to remain with pluralism. 128  In
Zambia, the Constitution was amended to eliminate the monopoly of
the United National Independence Party. 129
In Kenya, however, President Daniel arap Moi spoke out strongly
121. Melinda Ham, The Waiting Game, AFR. REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 45-46 (in Zambia,
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy outdrawing the former monopoly party ten to one at
public rallies); Salim Lone, Democracy Push Widespread, AFR. NEWS, Apr. 1, 1991, at 7; John
Owen-Davies, OA U Ministers Set to Grapple with Change in Africa, Reuter Library Report, May
26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File; see also Democracy and Despots:
The State of Government in Black Africa, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1991, at 5 (giving a capsule
account of recent changes for each African State).
122. Demands for National Conferences Mount, AFR. NEWS, June 24, 1991, at 4 (public
demonstrations demanding a national conference leading to multi-party politics in Togo, Came-
roon); Sennen Andriamirado, Est-ce vraiment la solution?, JEUNE AFRIQUE, June 26, 1991, at 16;
Albert Bourgi, Les dtats gdneraux de Ia dimocratie, JEUNE AFRIQUE, June 26, 1991, at 26; Na-
tional Conferences Forge Changes, APR. NEWS, Aug. 26, 1991, at 3 (all three articles describing
national conferences in Francophone States).
123. David C. Walters, Africa Update, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 1, 1990, at 4.
124. Id.; Ivorian Protests Spread, AFR. NEWS, June 24, 1991, at 1.
125. Togo Seeks New Future, AFR. NEWS, July 15, 1991, at 1. Togo's reform was stormy, as
the military intervened three times in 1991 against a transitional parliament. Assembly Approves
New Cabinet and Conciliatory Program, Agence France Presse, Dec. 31, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File; Walters, supra note 123, at 4.
126. Walters, supra note 123, at 4.
127. Kenneth B. Noble, Congo Political Conference Gives Africa a Democratic Model, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1991, at AS.
128. Zimbabwe: Tekere to Contest Presidential Election, Inter Press Service, Feb. 23, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRESS File.
129. John Mukela, Kaunda Unveils Multi-Party Era in Fighting Mood, INDEPENDENT
(London), Dec. 5, 1990, at 10; Zambia Democracy Supporters Form First Legal Opposition Party,
Dec. 20, 1990, Reuter Library Report, Dec. 20, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REU-
TER File; Zambia OKs Constitution, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, at AI5 (parliament approves
new constitution providing for multi-party system); Zambia's Ruler Sets 1st Multiparty Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1991, at A5.
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in support of one-party rule. "A multi-party system introduced now,"
he said, "would lead to alliance of tribal groups expressing tribal senti-
ments not public opinion." For Africa, he said, "starting multi-party
systems will definitely trigger off chaotic situations difficult to re-
verse."' 130 When Oginga Odinga, a former vice-president of Kenya,
tried to form a National Democratic Party, 131 the attorney general
refused to register it, and the High Court upheld the refusal.1 32
One spur to reform of the party system in Africa came from the
South. As South Africa appeared to be moving towards political par-
ticipation for its African population, African leaders found it more
difficult to explain why they excluded nonparty citizens from a polit-
ical role. 133
The major impetus, however, came from the North. While there
had long been opposition to one-party rule in Africa, the move to plu-
ralism in Eastern Europe in 1989 quickly assumed importance in Af-
rica. The U.S.S.R. had been an implicit role model to some
proponents of one-party rule, and the reforms in Eastern Europe en-
couraged those citizens who had long advocated party pluralism to
make this issue public. Many one-party leaders in Africa, watching
one-party leaders fall in Eastern Europe, decided it was time for
concessions. 134
African leaders also feared that with Eastern Europe becoming a
venue for Western trade and investment, Africa would be even less
able to sell its products and to attract investment. In 1990 as well, the
West began to pressure Africa to move towards political pluralism,
and African leaders feared losing Western economic activity, includ-
ing aid, if they did not reform. 135 The impact of Western pressure was
130. Kenyan President Rejects Multi-Party System for Africa, Reuter Library Report, Mar.
23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
131. Gitobu Imanyara, Odinga Launches New Party, NAIROBI L. MONTHLY, Feb. 1991, at
27; Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Our Stand, NAIROBI L. MONTHLY, Feb. 1991, at 28.
132. Richard Dowden, Africa Ponders Democracy Moves, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 3,
1991, at 6; Kenya High Court Turns Down Odinga Application to Register New Party, BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, July 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
On the court proceedings, see Andrew Kuria, Odinga Wants New Judge in NDP Case, DAILY
NATION (Nairobi), June 18, 1991, at 1.
133. Neil Henry, Reforms in Pretoria Put Black Rulers on Spot, WASH. POST, July 11, 1991,
at A23 (quoting an Africa Watch official saying, "the changes in South Africa have left many
with nowhere to hide when it comes to their own rule"); Michael Johns, A New Liberation Doc-
trine for Africa, Heritage Foundation Reports, Backgrounder No. 822, Apr. 12, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, HFRPTS File (saying changes in South Africa made it more difficult for
African leaders to deflect criticism by pointing a finger at South Africa).
134. Richard Dowden, Africa Shaken by 'Second Liberation,' INDEPENDENT (London), July
29, 1991, at 10.
135. Jacques de Barrin, M. Mitterand Lie lOctroi de l'Aide Franqaise aux Efforts de
Dimocratisation, LE MONDE, June 22, 1990, at 3 (Mitterand, in a speech at the Franco-African
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felt most dramatically in Kenya. In late 1991, donor States informed
the Kenyan government that they were suspending aid programs be-
cause of its refusal to abandon the single-party system. President Moi,
who had staunchly opposed change, said he would propose elimina-
tion of the constitutional provision establishing a single party and
would call for multiparty elections. 136
A rethinking of economic policy accompanied the rethinking of
pluralism, and the two reform tendencies fed each other. The new
thought in economics stressed regional trade and self-reliance, as op-
posed to North-South trade and reliance on exports to the industrial-
ized world. In 1989 the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (ECA) published its African Alternative Framework to Struc-
tural Adjustment Programs as a blueprint for economic develop-
ment.13 7 Echoing Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's prescription
for economic improvement in the Soviet Union, the ECA said that
democratic reforms in Africa were a prerequisite for economic devel-
opment. 138 Earlier, economic development had been said to require a
strong central authority. But African economies had deteriorated dur-
ing the 1980s, and the lack of inclusion of a broad base in decision-
making came to be seen as an impediment to development. If those in
power were more accountable to the public, it was argued, they would
make decisions that better promoted economic development., 39 If the
people had more confidence in government, they would be more will-
ing to sacrifice in the interests of development. 40
The ECA hosted a conference in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1990, where
an "African Charter for Popular Participation in Development" was
adopted, and delegates expressed a concern that the lack of democracy
in Africa was a cause of the continent's continuing poverty.14 1 This
view was shared by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who as
chair of the Organization of African Unity declared that "the estab-
lishment of democracy is a necessary condition for stable economic
summit, alluded to free elections and multipartyism and said, "France will link its entire aid
effort to the efforts that are made to go more towards liberty").
136. Democracy Movements Win Round One, AFR. NEWS, Dec. 9-23, 1991, at 11.
137. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE
FRAMEWORK TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC RECOVERY
AND TRANSFORMATION (AAF-SAP), U.N. Doc. E/ECA/CM.15/6/Rev.3 (1989) [hereinafter
AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK].
138. Lone, supra note 121, at 7.
139. AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 137, at 7.
140. Id. at 43.
141. Anaclet Rwegayura, Africa: Putting People First in Development, Inter Press Service,
Feb. 12, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRESS File.
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development." 42
The African Alternative Framework reopened a longstanding de-
bate about the causes of underdevelopment in Africa. One school of
thought viewed the problem as primarily external. The European
powers had conquered Africa and disrupted its traditional economy by
capturing thousands of able-bodied people to be sold as slaves, and by
instituting an export-oriented plantation economy that deprived the
population of the ability to grow essential foodstuffs.143 According to
this view, in the post-independence period, Europe, with the United
States now involved as well, controlled Africa by operating industries
and dominating the export trade. To make matters worse, after inde-
pendence the terms of trade for African products deteriorated vis-i-vis
the manufactured goods of the industrialized world, leading Africa
into greater poverty. The prescription was self-sufficiency. Africa
should end its concentration on the export of raw materials and should
develop the ability to produce manufactured products for itself. For-
eign trade should be reoriented to other Third World States, and away
from the industrialized world.'"
A second school of thought found the causes of African un-
derdevelopment in Africa itself. Africa had missed the industrial
revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and needed to
model itself on the industrialized world to catch up. For this purpose
it needed to integrate itself as fully as possible into the international
economy, selling its raw materials to accumulate capital for industrial-
ization. Credits from international lending agencies were needed, and
African States were therefore forced to abide by the economic pre-
scriptions of the International Monetary Fund, which typically asked
them to tighten spending and reduce social services, in order to pay off
their foreign debt.
To adherents of the first school of thought, however, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund was a tool of continued Western domination of
Africa, and a guarantee of nondevelopment. The African Alternative
Framework tilted towards this view, criticizing IMF restrictions as
having failed to improve African economies. 145 The Framework called
for less reliance on foreign aid and investment,'146 product diversifica-
142. African States Sign Common Market Treaty, DAILY NEWS (Dar es Salaam), June 5,
1991, at 1.
143. WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA passim (1976).
144. See M.L. Baregu, Africa: Imperatives for Delinking from the Capitalist World Economy,
15 AFR. REV.: J. AFR. POL., DEV., & INT'L AFF. 14 (1988).
145. AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 137, at 16-25.
146. Id. at 33 ("Even if such resources could be attracted, it is almost certain that the terms
and conditions on which they would be made available would be such as to offer mere temporary
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tion to reduce monoculture export dependence, 147 maintenance of,
and even increases in, spending on education and health care, 148 re-
duced military spending,149 pursuit of self-sufficiency in food produc-
tion, 150 regional trade as partial replacement for North-South trade,' 5'
and selective privatization, but maintenance of parastatals where pri-
vate parties were unable to function effectively. 5 2  In 1991, in line
with this approach, the Organization of African Unity called for the
establishment of an African common market, 5 3 although there was no
immediate prospect that such a market could be achieved, because of
Africa's strong economic ties with the industrialized world. 5 4 The
anticipated achievement of an integrated economy in Western Europe
in 1992 came as a new challenge to an African economy that was al-
ready deteriorating in relation to the West. African economists feared
that the new European Community trading bloc would hurt Africa. 55
African politicians worried that Western aid-giving States might
cut aid or investment if pluralism were not introduced. 5 6 Some West-
ern aid-giving States, and the International Monetary Fund, indicated
that in making their aid decisions they would look more favorably on
States permitting political pluralism. 57
relief to the African countries and serve more to aggravate and deepen their structural problems
and deficiencies.").
147. Id. at 13, 34.
148. Id. at 33-34 (characterizing these expenditures as "prerequisites of an enabling environ-
ment" for growth).
149. Id. at 35 (noting that Africa spends more on military than on education, whereas Latin
America twice as much on education as on military).
150. Id. at 11, 36.
151. Id. at 13-14, 36, 45; Africa's Economic Performance Improving, U.N. CHRONICLE, June
1990, at 72; African Economic Ministers to Look Towards Self Help, Reuter Library Report, May
14, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File (ministers discussing E.C.A. propos-
als); Africa: Nyerere Calls for Economic Integration, Inter Press Service, May 28, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRESS File (urging Africa to integrate economically to achieve
"true economic independence").
152. AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 137, at 47.
153. Treaty Establishing an African Economic Community, June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1245
(1991).
154. Tunda Obadina, Africa Moves Towards Economic Unity to Boost Growth, Reuter Library
Report, June 5, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File. Several regional eco-
nomic groupings already existed - the Economic Community of West African States, Preferen-
tial Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States. See Hawa Sinare, The Treaty for the
Establishment of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States and Its
Relevance to Economic Integration, 5 LESOTHO L.J. 77 (1989).
155. Worries Attend New Initiatives, AFR. NEWS, Jan. 29, 1990, at 1.
156. Richard Joseph, Glasnost for Africa?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1989, at A21 (quoting
Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian Head of State: "We are amazed to the point of frustration
as we watch substantial amounts of funds being appropriated for economic reforms in just a few
countries of Eastern Europe, while we continue to wait for the West to honor its far more modest
financial commitments" to Africa).
157. Kibwana, supra note 16, at 34; Rowena Whelan, IMF Chief at Start of East African
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V. THE DEBATE ON PLURALISM IN TANZANIA
In 1990, the pluralism issue took center stage in Tanzania, when
the CCM announced that it would rethink the matter after twenty-five
years of one-party rule. 158 As elsewhere in Africa, the precipitating
event appears to have been the end of one-party rule in Eastern Eu-
rope.159 Nyerere, then still the CCM Chair, said that the develop-
ments in Eastern Europe were of major concern since Tanzania, like
Eastern Europe, had a one-party State and was in the process of build-
ing socialism. Nyerere said that African leaders should learn from the
Eastern European developments that leaders must work closely with
the citizenry. He said that a one-party system was "not Tanzania's
ideology," and it could lull leaders into "a sound sleep" and held the
danger of oppressing citizens. 16 He said, "Tanzanians should not be
dogmatic and think that a single party is God's wish."' 16 1
While encouraging debate on pluralism, the CCM leadership re-
jected external pressure. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi objected to the
suggestions from aid-giving States that a multiparty system was a pre-
condition for aid. 162 Nyerere found it "incredible" that the industrial-
ized world was trying to tell Africa to move to pluralism as a
condition of economic aid. He said that Africans would not accept
dictation but would decide the issue on the basis of their own needs. 63
Nyerere also rejected the equation of party pluralism with democracy:
''our commitment to democracy is clear ... the main problem is that
the North believes democracy can only be expressed in the form of a
multi-party system." Further, he said, "I'm worried that the North is
saying that without a multi-party system there can't be democracy. I
don't accept that. We have respect for human beings, participation at
Tour, Urges More Democracy, Reuter Library Report, Aug. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, REUTER File (IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus, noting, however, that IMF
financial support would not be conditioned on specific political changes).
158. Paul Chintowa, Tanzania: Leaders to Debate Multi-Party Democracy, Inter Press Ser-
vice, Feb. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRESS File.
159. Peter Temba, Kilimanjaro Want One Party System, DAILY NEWS (Dares Salaam), July
11, 1991, at 5 (multiparty advocates invoke changes elsewhere as a reason for change in
Tanzania).
160. Tanzania Nyerere Says One-Party System Not the Country's "Ideology," BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, Feb. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
161. Jane Perlez, African Elder Trims One-Party Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1990, at A10.
162. Tanzanian Vice-President on Political Reform, Xinhua General Overseas News Service,
June 7, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File.
163. Africa: Nyerere Notes External Pressure to Democratize, Inter Press Service, Dec. 12,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRESS File (Nyerere stating, "If there is a need to
have changes, let's agree ourselves and not because of external pressures"); Nyerere. Let Africans
Choose Their Future Political Destiny, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, May 10, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File.
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all levels ... we gave our people a sense of dignity and freedom.' 64
Nyerere's effort to encourage debate was not universally wel-
comed. Vice-President Joseph Warioba warned that reform "has
caused a lot of trouble," including political instability, in other African
States.1 65 A group of twenty Tanzanian army colonels issued a state-
ment that pluralism would threaten the national unity that it had
taken twenty-five years to build. 166
President Mwinyi's government refused registration to a pro-mul-
tiparty group, the Civil and Legal Rights Movement, 1 67 but in Febru-
ary 1991, President Mwinyi appointed a twenty-two-member
commission to study pluralism and report back to him within one
year. 168 Half the commission's members were from Zanzibar, and half
from the mainland. In a seven-point document titled "Terms of Refer-
ence," Mwinyi asked the commission both to give its own recommen-
dation and to "collect people's views in the debate on whether
Tanzania continues with a one-party political system or adopts multi-
partism." 169
Some multiparty proponents objected to the commission's
makeup, as it consisted entirely of CCM members, and they an-
nounced they were forming a Committee for a Transition Toward a
Multi-Party System, to promote party pluralism. Chief Abdallah
Fundikira, chair of the group, charged that President Mwinyi's intent
in forming the commission was merely "to cool the tempers of the
restless people wanting genuine democracy now."' 170 It called for an
immediate constitutional conference, on the order of those being held
in West Africa. 171 President Mwinyi, however, ruled that the Com-
mittee for a Transition Toward a Multi-Party System could not begin
164. Nyerere Also Spoke Out Against What He Described, Reuter Library Report, Nov. 28,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
165. Tanzanian Vice-President on Political Reform, supra note 162.
166. East and Horn of Africa in Brief- Tanzania Army Officers Reportedly Rule Out Multi-
Party System but Favour Reform, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 23, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
167. Fimbo, supra note 92, at n.1l.
168. Tanzania President Appoints Members of Commission on Party System, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, Feb. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File;
Tanzanian President Cautions Commission on Pluralism Against Bias, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Mar. 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
169. Presidential Commission on Multi-Party or Single-Party Political System in Tanzania,
Terms of Reference, 1 1-2 (1991) (on file with author).
170. Tanzanian President Bans Opposition, Reviews One Party State, Reuter Library Report,
Mar. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File. In the 1960s Fundikira was
Minister of Justice and a member of TANU's inner circle of leadership. PRATF, supra note 26, at
51, 95, 213; Bates, supra note 4, at 457.
171. Opponents in Tanzania Demand Constitutional Conference, Xinhua General Overseas
News Service, June 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File.
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operation, since it had not registered, as is required of all public bodies
in Tanzania, 172 and he forbade it to hold a planned public meeting. 173
Later, the group registered and was allowed to function, 74 and it es-
tablished a National Committee for Constitutional Reform. 175
Concern was voiced that the debate would be circumscribed by
regulations on street demonstrations. 176 As the commission was ap-
pointed, preventive detention was still being applied against political
opponents.177 The Committee for a Transition Toward a Multi-Party
System demanded the suspension of the Preventive Detention Act and
the Deportation Ordinance for the duration of the public debate, and
amnesty for political prisoners. 178
The President's powers over the press were also cited as a limita-
tion on the debate.179 The Newspapers Act let the President stop the
publication of any newspaper in the "public interest," or "in the inter-
est of peace and good order,"' 80 and the President had shut down
newspapers of political opponents.181 Tanzanian newspapers, which
had typically deferred to the CCM, 182 were accused by one multi-
party proponent of giving more coverage to one-party supporters. 183
172. Tanzanian President Bans Opposition, Reviews One Party State, Reuter Library Report,
Mar. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File; Societies Ordinance, No. 11 of
1954, TANGANYIKA REVISED LAWS Cap. 337, § 7 (requiring any society to register), § 9 (requir-
ing registrar to refuse registration to a society likely to be used for a purpose prejudicial to peace,
order, or good government).
173. Meeting of Students and Opposition Group Banned in Tanzania, Xinhua General Over-
seas News Service, Mar. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File; Seminar
on Multi-Party Rule Postponed in Tanzania, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Apr. 4,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File.
174. Fundikira Invited Nyerere to Side with Multi-Party Democracy, Bus. TIMES (Dar es
Salaam), May 24, 1991, at 4 (letter written by organizer of the group); Opponents in Tanzania
Demand Constitutional Conference, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, June 11, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File (two-day seminar held by the group).
175. Dowden, supra note 25, at 8 (reporting that the Committee dismissed Fundikira as chair
after he announced in London that he was forming a new political party; the Committee called
the effort premature).
176. Dissolve Union Cabinet - Seminar, supra note 118, at 5.
177. Mbena Mwanatongoni, Sick Member Freed and Deported, Bus. TIMES (Dares Salaam),
May 24, 1991, at I (Mussa Membar, founder of Tanzania Youth Democratic Movement, a
London-based exile group, who in 1982 had hijacked an Air Tanzania plane, held in preventive
detention seven months); Chase Mdoe, Ukonga Accused ofIll Treating Membar, Bus. TIMES
(Dar es Salaam), May 31, 1991, at I (Membar dies, relatives charge officials of Ukonga prison,
where he was detained, of failing to provide medical treatment after Membar became ill).
178. Opponents in Tanzania Demand Constitutional Conference, supra note 171.
179. Issa G. Shivji, Minimum Legal Conditions to Begin the Process of Democratisation in
Tanzania, 17 E. AFR. L. REV. (1990).
180. Newspapers Act, No. 3 of 1976, TANZANIA REVISED LAWS Supp. 76, § 25.
181. MARTIN, supra note 61, at 94-96.
182. PRATT, supra note 26, at 212.
183. Timothy S. Kapinga, We Are Already Divided, SUNDAY NEWS (Dar es Salaam), June 9,
1991, at 5.
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The presidential commission, nonetheless, took up its task, divid-
ing itself into seven groups to hold hearings around the country to
collect public opinion. From May to October 1991, it held hearings
throughout Tanzania, which were widely reported in the press. Some
were also broadcast by radio, and in Zanzibar on television.1 84 The
commission also sent questionnaires to Tanzanians living abroad and
solicited written opinion from the public, agreeing to entertain even
anonymous statements. Although the commission's report was to be
only advisory to the President, the Chief Minister of Zanzibar said
that the Zanzibari government would respect the public's prefer-
ence.185 Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization
of African Unity, and a Tanzanian, commended Tanzania for the or-
derly fashion in which the debate was being conducted.18 6
The public hearings brought out opinion on both sides of the issue.
One-party proponents, repeating the argument made in the 1960s,
feared that nationalist rivalries would come to the fore under a mul-
tiparty system.18 7 The bloody nationality conflicts that accompanied
the end to one-party rule in Eastern Europe heightened this concern.
Another concern was that political parties might divide along religious
lines. In Tanzania, where one-third of the population practices Islam,
one-third Christianity, and one-third traditional religions, one-party
proponents feared conflict between Muslims and Christians. The
Terms of Reference directed the commission to assess the impact of a
switch to a multiparty system on "unity, peace and concord amongst
all Tanzanians regardless of tribe, creed, race or gender," and to make
proposals for guarding against unrest based on these factors if a mul-
tiparty system were adopted. ' 8  This injunction also directed the com-
mission's attention to a concern that if new political parties were
allowed to form, some of them might seek a breakup of the union
between Zanzibar and the mainland.
Over and above these considerations, however, the most persistent
184. There is no television broadcasting in mainland Tanzania.
185. Ali Uki, Isles Pledges to Respect People's Views on Pluralism, DAILY NEWS (Dar es
Salaam), June 8, 1991, at 1; Zanzibar President Briefs French Envoy on Political and Economic
Situation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, BBCSWB File (Salmin Amour, Zanzibar President, said any system agreed upon by the
citizens would be adopted); see also Tanzania: Mwinyi Calls for View of the People on a Multi-
Party System, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBCSWB File (saying the majority view would receive "careful attention").
186. OA U Commends Peaceful Discussion About Political System in Tanzania, Xinhua Gen-
eral Overseas News Service, July 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File.
187. Shy-Rose Bhanji & Moses Kitururu, "Multi-Partism Will Invite Recolonisation,,"
DAILY NEWS (Dares Salaam), May 21, 1991, at I (quoting Nyangize Bakari and Rose Mgwai at
a public meeting).
188. Terms of Reference, supra note 169, 3-4.
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argument made for maintaining one-party politics was that Tanzania
enjoyed political stability which pluralism might jeopardize. t8 9
Tanzania "should never trade off its tranquility," said a one-party pro-
ponent. 90 Another said that if political parties were allowed to con-
tend, the army might step in and put an end to any form of
democracy. 191
Unlike many other African States, Tanzania had been free of suc-
cessful coups and rebellions since instituting one-party rule. 192 How-
ever, in 1964, just prior to one-party rule, there had been a coup
attempt by the army on the mainland, and a violent overthrow of the
government in Zanzibar. Thus, the one-party system was a known
quantity. With pluralism, tendencies might emerge that would lead to
political violence. The Terms of Reference asked the commission to
explore "ways of guarding against any dangers of a political nature or
national security that might arise as a result of change or the lack of it
in our political system." 93
Despite the concern over stability, the ground swell for ending one-
party rule in Africa suggested that the tranquility enjoyed under a sin-
gle party might not last. All over Africa, the public was taking the
matter into its own hands, and in some cases resorting to violence.
Concern over such public feeling may well have been behind the CCM
decision to take the party issue to the public.
Multiparty proponents came forward with their arguments. They
said that it did not make sense to suppress opposing political tenden-
cies, and that the political climate would be healthier if all ideas could
compete. In the debate, the connection between politics and econom-
ics proved controversial. Some multiparty proponents, in agreement
with the U.N. view, saw multipartyism as a cure for Tanzania's des-
perate economic situation. Proponents of a one-party State, however,
objected that the causes of the economic crisis lay elsewhere, and that
189. Ali Uki, "We Don't Want to Jump on Multi-Party Bandwagon," DAILY NEWS (Dar es
Salaam), May 20, 1991, at 1. For an analysis expressing this concern on a continent-wide basis,
see Anver Versi, Democratic Debate, NEW AFR., June 1991, at 9 (arguing that political parties
appeal to the lowest common denominator, that the lowest common denominator is ethnicity,
and that the parties representing the largest ethnic groups therefore would win under a multi-
party system).
190. Bhanji & Kitururu, supra note 187, at I (quoting Ali Keto at a public meeting).
191. Methuen Chinyuka, Too Early for Multi-Partism - Commission Told, DAILY NEWS
(Dar es Salaam), July 12, 1991, at 1.
192. In 1983 there was an apparent coup attempt, based in the military, that led to the arrest
of several hundred persons. John Worrall, Tanzanian Coup Foiled, but Not Economic Woes,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 24, 1983, at 11.
193. Terms of Reference, supra note 169, 4.
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it was unrealistic to view an opening of the political system as a
panacea.
Some one-party proponents feared that the poor would suffer
under a multiparty system because the wealthy might make parlia-
ment serve their interests. Tanzania has one of the lowest per capita
income levels in the world, and thus its poorest can ill afford any re-
duction in standard of living. In particular, the fear was expressed in
Zanzibar that a multiparty parliament might overturn land expropria-
tions of 1964 that had distributed plots to the poor, or revoke rent
subsidies in effect for low-income people or free education and health
services. 194 Some rural Zanzibaris feared that a multiparty system
would encourage revenge by supporters of the sultan who was over-
thrown in Zanzibar in 1964.195 As the presidential commission began
its work, Nyerere, somewhat surprisingly, ventured the opinion that
most Tanzanians still favored a one-party system. 196
Pluralism was supported by many CCM members, but it was op-
posed by many CCM functionaries whose positions would be jeopard-
ized if the CCM lost its monopoly. 197 The difference of opinion within
the CCM raised the possibility that the National Assembly might be
able to muster a majority to revoke the CCM's constitutional monop-
oly on power. Unless, as has happened in some African States, new
processes outside the existing order were established, it would be the
National Assembly that would have to take the decision to amend the
Constitution to eliminate the one-party monopoly.198
Apart from arguments for and against the one-party system, the
national debate elicited scathing attacks on the CCM, to the extent
that it was not always clear whether the critics supported multiparty
politics or simply found the CCM corrupt. At one public meeting of
the presidential commission, citizens complained that CCM officials
harassed and humiliated them to make monetary contributions to the
party. Other citizens called CCM leaders "dictatorial"'' 99 and said
194. Ali Uki, "Common Man Will Suffer under Multi-Party Rule," DAILY NEWS (Dar es
Salaam), May 30, 1991, at 1; see Uki, supra note 189, at 1.
195. Uki, supra note 189, at 1.
196. Nyerere: Let Africans Choose Their Future Political Destiny, Xinhua General Overseas
News Service, May 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File.
197. See, e.g., Tanzania Ruling Party Leader on Political System, Xinhua General Overseas
News Service, June 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File (Rashid
Kawawa, CCM vice-chair, said CCM would not welcome a multiparty system because it might
destroy unity among the people).
198. E.P. Mikongoti, The Road to Democracy by Political Pluralism, Bus. TIMES (Dar es
Salaam), May 31, 1991, at 4.
199. Temba, note 159, at 5.
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they were not called to account for criminal abuse of office.2°° One
man said that when party leaders mistreated people, higher-ups to
whom complaints were made did nothing, "because the leaders pro-
tected one another."' 20 1 CCM leaders warned citizens against turning
the debate into "platforms of unleashing vitriolic attacks against CCM
and its leaders," saying this might lead to chaos. 20 2
The criticisms made of the CCM during the debate led to several
immediate reforms. To facilitate party membership and thereby make
the party more accessible, the CCM eliminated a three-month ideolog-
ical course that had been a requirement for admission.20 3 To reduce
its control over society, the CCM loosened its ties to five mass organi-
zations that, according to the Constitution, function "under the um-
brella of the Party. ' 204 The CCM also planned a recruitment drive
aimed at increasing CCM membership by forty percent.20 5
VI. AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON AFRICAN
PERESTROIKA
Since the emergence in international law of a human rights regime,
mechanisms of governance have assumed an international aspect.
They are judged not only in terms of domestic law, but by universal
norms. States have undertaken to abide by these standards, which ac-
cord rights to citizens against the State. As will appear below, the
standards are also relevant to States that provide economic aid.
Human rights law has developed norms of some precision on issues
involving a State's treatment of an individual, such as one charged
with crime, but it has experienced difficulty with rights issues affecting
a society as a whole, such as political participation.
On the question of political party pluralism, human rights law is
200. Peter Temba, CCM Leadership Should Resign, Commission Told, DAILY NEWS (Dares
Salaam), June 13, 1991, at 5 (a woman said, "Why are the big shots not taken to court when they
steal public funds or abuse their positions?").
201. Wananchi Give Views on Better Political System, DAILY NEWS (Dar es Salaam), June 6,
1991, at 3 (statement of Daniel Majengo at a public meeting of the presidential commission).
"Wananchi" is the Swahili word for "citizens."
202. Tanzanians Warned Against Abusing Ruling Party, Xinhua General Overseas News Ser-
vice, June 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File (statement of Prime
Minister John Malecela).
203. Party Hails Kagera for Recruiting More Members, DAILY NEWS (Dar es Salaam), June
28, 1991, at 1; Kibwana, supra note 16, at 35.
204. 1984 TANZ. CONST., supra note 81, § 80(l)(a) (listing the Union of Tanzanian Women
(UWT), the Union of Workers (Juwata), the Youth Organization (Vijana), the Apex Organiza-
tion of Cooperative Societies, and the Parents' Organization (Wazazi)); see Gavin Evans, Africa.
Campaign for Independent Trade Unionism Takes Hold, Inter Press Service, June 27, 199 1, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRESS File (on new independent status of Juwata).
205. CCM to Recruit Im New Members, SUNDAY NEWS (Dares Salaam), July 14, 1991, at 1.
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vague. Two rights found in the law are relevant: freedom of associa-
tion and the right to participate in government. The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights states, "Everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association, ' ' 2°6 "Everyone has the right to take
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely cho-
sen representatives," and "The will of the people shall be the basis of
the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic
and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures. '20 7
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides,
"Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others, ' 208 and
Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity... without unreason-
able restrictions... to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives; ... to vote and to be elected at
genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of the electors.2°9
The three regional human rights treaties contain similar provi-
sions. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (regarding Europe) states, "Everyone has the
right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association
with others, ' 210 and a protocol to that convention states, "The High
Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable in-
tervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature." 2 11
The American Convention on Human Rights (regarding the West-
ern Hemisphere) provides, "Everyone has the right to associate freely
for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural,
sports, or other purposes, '212 and
206. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 20(I), G.A.Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71, 75 (1948).
207. Id. art. 21(l), 21(3).
208. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, § 22(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
209. Id. art. 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
210. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 11, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 232 (hereinafter European Convention).
211. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Mar. 20, 1952, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, 264.
212. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 16, O.A.S. Official
Records OEA/Ser.K/XVI/l.I, Document 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2, Jan. 7, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 673, 680
(1970).
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Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: (a) to
take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely cho-
sen representatives; (b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic
elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret
ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters. 213
The most relevant human rights treaty for Tanzania is the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which states, "Every individ-
ual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by
the law,"'2 14 and "Every citizen shall have the right to participate
freely in the government of his country, either directly or through
freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the
law."' 2 15 Most African governments had one-party rule when these
provisions were adopted, but did not consider them inconsistent with
the one-party system.
None of the universal or regional human rights instruments di-
rectly mentions political parties, or any requirement that more than
one be permitted, but they all require States to afford citizens a genu-
ine role in the election of parliamentary representatives. Scholars have
had difficulty defining the scope of the right to political participa-
tion.2 16 The case law under the European Convention, where one
finds the most extensive international practice, contains little material
on access by political parties. 217 A specific mention of the right of
political opposition had been proposed for the European human rights
system, but was not included. 2 18
In one case, Britain's Liberal Party challenged the majority voting
system used in parliament, arguing that it disadvantaged minority par-
ties, and that a system of proportional representation, as found in
other States, should be required. The European Commission of
Human Rights disagreed, however, saying that
European supervision comes into play where first a particular electoral
system is arbitrary or manifestly unfair in its effects upon voters or can-
213. Id. art. 23, 9 I.L.M. at 682.
214. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, opened for signature June 27, 1981, art.
10, 21 I.L.M. 58, 61 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, 7 HUM. RTs L.J. 403 (1986)).
215. Id. art. 13, 21 I.L.M. at 61.
216. See, e.g., The Human Right to Participate in Government: Toward an Operational Defini-
tion, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 505 (1988).
217. ZAIM M. NEDJATI, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 201-07
(1978).
218. Draft of the European Movement, noted in P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 478-79 (1990); KARL J.
PARTSCH, DIE RECHTE UND FREIHEITEN DER EUROPAISCHEN MENSCHENRECHTSKONVEN-
TION 241-43 (1966); see also EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: MANUAL 63 (1963)
(right to free elections was inserted in European Convention as an underpinning for the protec-
tion of all other rights).
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didates of given political opinions or party affiliation, and secondly
where it is those very effects which mainly encourage and explain the
partisan perpetuation of the system, and where thirdly there is no effec-
tive remedy before a national authority for the claim of political
discrimination. 2 19
This statement implies that if a party were excluded from parliament
altogether, the right to free elections would be violated.
In a case filed against Greece when it was under military rule, the
European Commission of Human Rights implied that the European
Convention requires Member States to allow political parties to oper-
ate. Noting that the Greek government had not permitted parliamen-
tary elections, it said that "the Greek people are thus prevented from
expressing their political opinions by choosing a legislature in accord-
ance with Article 3.1"220 It said, "Political parties are prohibited and
... they cannot be reorganised and their charters formally approved.
This is all in clear and persistent breach of Article 3 of the Protocol,"
a reference to the protocol on free elections.
22
'
On the other hand, the Commission recognized that, under the Eu-
ropean Convention, it may be permissible to suspend parliamentary
rights during a "public emergency threatening the life of the na-
tion."' 222 A judge who rendered a concurring opinion in the Greek
case acknowledged the potential validity of the Greek government's
argument that a suspension of parliamentary elections was permissible
in the face of a danger that the Communist Party might come to
power: "So long as the danger, which in this case is political since it is
stated to be due to the Communist party and its allies, has not been
averted, a country could not hold free elections without fear of the
danger reviving. '2
23
In another case, the European Commission of Human Rights per-
mitted the banning of a political party on the grounds that it advo-
cated the abolition of democratic institutions. The German Federal
Constitutional Court had ordered the German Communist Party to be
dissolved, on the rationale that it promoted a dictatorship of the prole-
tariat, which implied a negation of democratic institutions. The Ger-
man Communist Party complained to the European Commission,
arguing that its freedom of association was infringed.
219. Liberal Party v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 211, 222 (1981).
220. Report of the European Commission of Human Rights on the Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Eur.
Cony. on H.R. 180 (1969) [hereinafter Greek Case].
221. Id. at 180; see also VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 218, at 479 (expressing the view
that "a one-party system imposed by the State" is "contrary to Article 3" of the First Protocol).
222. Id. at 180; European Convention, supra note 210, art. 15, 21 U.N.T.S. at 232.
223. Greek Case, supra note 220, at 180.
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Article 17 of the European Convention, however, stated that no
right in the Convention could be relied on to justify acts aimed at de-
stroying the rights included in the Convention. 224 The Commission
said that even if the German Communist Party sought to gain power
only by constitutional means, its ultimate aims would bring the de-
struction of rights protected by the European Convention. Therefore,
it could ban the Communist Party without violating its freedom of
association. 225
The position taken by the Commission in this case, like the opinion
of the concurring judge in the Greek case, suggests that if political
pluralism in a particular situation endangered representative govern-
ment, a State could lawfully ban a political party, or refuse to hold
elections. On this basis, Tanzania could argue that permitting any op-
position parties would threaten national unity.
Tanzania could also cite the fact that the human rights instru-
ments all contain escape clauses. Under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the freedom of association may be lim-
ited by restrictions "necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security. ' 226 The American Convention on Human Rights
contains an identical limitation.227 The European Commission of
Human Rights permitted banning a meeting of an Austrian organiza-
tion devoted to reuniting Austria with Germany on the grounds that
the ban was "necessary in a democratic society. ' '228 The Commission
reasoned that Austria was required by treaty to maintain its neutrality,
and to achieve this aim it could engage in activity that otherwise
would be a rights violation. 229 This kind of exception would seem to
open the way for Nyerere's argument that political pluralism could
lead to political instability and violence.
In Tanzania, there is no quarrel with the proposition that partici-
pation in government is a right. "One of the fundamental rights of
every citizen in a democratic political system," said one official, "is the
right to take an equal part in the government, or the right to partici-
pate meaningfully in the decision-making process of the system which
224. European Convention, supra note 210, art. 17, 213 U.N.T.S. at 233.
225. Communist Party of Germany v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1957 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Doc. & Dec. 222, 224-25 (1961) (in French), translated in 24 INT'L L. RPTS. 1957, at 349
(1961).
226. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 208, art. 22, 999
U.N.T.S. at 178.
227. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 212, art. 16, 9 I.L.M. at 680.
228. A. Association and H. v. Austria, App. No. 9905/82, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 187, 193 (1984).
229. Id.
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governs him."' 230 The Tanzanian Constitution recognizes rights of as-
sociation and participation in government in terms similar to those
found in the international instruments:
Subject to the laws of the land, every person is entitled to freedom of
peaceful assembly, association and public expression, that is to say, the
right to assemble freely and peaceably, to associate with other persons
and, in particular to form or belong to organisations or associations
formed for the purposes of protecting or furthering his or any other
interests.231
Further, "Every citizen of the Union Republic has the right to partici-
pate in the affairs of governing the country, either directly or through
officials elected voluntarily by the people in accordance with laid down
guidelines and law," and in addition, "Every citizen has the right and
freedom to participate fully in the process of decisionmaking on mat-
ters affecting him, his life and those affecting the nation. '2 32
Thus, the Tanzanian Constitution, like the international instru-
ments, guarantees freedom of association and the right to participate
in government. These constitutional provisions were adopted, of
course, with full knowledge that they would be applied in a de jure
one-party system.
As for the application of the international norm, it is difficult to
reject outright a political order because it is one-party. If a one-party
system effectively permitted all points of view to be entertained, it
might not seriously restrict the right to participate in government. It
might be easier to find one-party rule a violation of the freedom of
association, as any dejure one-party system limits the right to form a
political party.
The government could respond that it allows, if it in fact does al-
low, political parties to form, but not to field candidates in parliamen-
tary elections. It might thus argue that it was satisfying the freedom
of association norm, although limiting it in one way in order to protect
national security.
If freedom of association is violated by a one-party system, but if
the right to participation is preserved through open procedures in that
one party, would there be a violation of human rights norms? It might
be contended that the right to participation is lex specialis in this situ-
ation because it is more specifically directed at the question of parlia-
mentary representation than is freedom of association, which is a right
that applies in a variety of contexts.
230. Msekwa, supra note 22, at 26.
231. 1984 TANZ. CONST., supra note 81, § 20(1).
232. Id. § 21.
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The notion that rights overlap and that in certain situations one
applies to the exclusion of another on the principle of lex specialis has
been recognized in international practice. An example is the interplay
between freedom of expression and freedom of association. Freedom
of association often involves freedom of expression, since the purpose
of association is typically some kind of expression. In a case involving
the banning of a public procession, however, the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights said that the real issue was association, and so
that right alone should be analyzed, to the exclusion of freedom of
expression. 233
The view has been expressed that freedom of association is not nec-
essarily violated by a one-party system if the system is sufficiently open
and inclusive of differing views that it can be said to reflect the will of
the majority of the population. 234 However, in most African one-
party systems this level of reflection of the majority will has not been
achieved. 235 As the one-party system has functioned in Tanzania, it
would not seem to satisfy freedom of association or the right to partici-
pate in government, and the case for a national security exception is
not sufficiently strong to warrant derogation.
In Africa, the one-party system has an historical logic. Although
its maintenance did allow party bureaucrats to feather their own nests
at public expense, many party activists genuinely believed it to be best-
suited for the good of the State. The overwhelming support for
TANU that served as a rationale for a one-party system at the time of
independence diminished after Britain departed, and political choices
needed to be made. In 1967, TANU made a significant choice with
the Arusha Declaration, which called for a major governmental role in
economic development. Nationalizations and the emergence of a net-
work of parastatal companies followed. In the mid-1980s the CCM
retrenched on the government role in the economy, again making a
significant political choice. Differences of opinion surfaced at both
junctures. The justification for a one-party approach is that these dif-
ferences can be accommodated within the party, and an appropriate
policy determined. The argument for a multiparty approach is that if
there were legal political opposition, it might keep the government
from making mistakes that later require major policy shifts.
233. Christians against Racism and Fascism v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8440/78, 21 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 138, 147-48 (1981), also in 24 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 179, 194
(1981); see also VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 218, at 321.
234. Ibrahim Fall, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Senegal, Lecture, at the International
Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France (July 3, 1981).
235. Id.
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The one-party approach did not secure the economic development
and political stability that justified it. Economic development was
poor in the decades following independence, and political upheaval
was frequent. 236 The view on development and political parties may
be changing. It was never established by any objective criteria that
multipartyism stunted economic growth. 237 In fact, the African Alter-
native Framework argued that political pluralism is better for eco-
nomic development. 238
While opening political systems to political parties would seem to
be a necessary ingredient for democratization, it is not necessarily suf-
ficient in and of itself. Other kinds of groups as well must be free to
organize, in order to press their views on the political parties.239 Most
African States, including Tanzania, lack developed community-based
groups that can influence national politics. 24° In Tanzania in particu-
lar, no group is permitted to form without gaining a license from the
government. 241
Further, so long as widespread poverty in Tanzania remains the
norm, the majority of the population will be unable to take advantage
of political rights. The daily struggle to survive takes precedence. The
time and expense of litigation make legal rights extremely difficult for
the majority to enforce. 242 Moreover, with a substantial discrepancy
between the educated rich and the illiterate poor, the former are better
able to organize politically and may promote their own interests to the
detriment of the latter.
Women also suffer from serious legal disabilities in Tanzania and
enjoy less access to political institutions than men. Multiparty politics
will not change that situation. A woman who attended a seminar on
multiparty politics sponsored by the Law Society (bar association) re-
ported that women in attendance did not speak forthrightly for fear of
236. Mubako, supra note 20, at 84-85.
237. Id. at 85.
238. AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 137, at 7 ("Basic rights, individual
freedom and democratic participation by the majority of the population are often lacking in
Africa. This pervasive lack of democracy also makes mobilisation and effective accountability
difficult. This is one important sense in which Africa needs more democratic political structures
in order to facilitate development."); id. at 15 ("The political systems will need to evolve to allow
for full democracy and participation by all sections of the society. Only in this way will it be
possible to persuade people to accept sacrifices and give their best energies to the task of transfor-
mation."); id. at 49-50.
239. Shivji, supra note 49, at 394-95.
240. EZE, supra note 43, at 58.
241. Societies Ordinance, supra note 172.
242. Shivji, supra note 49, at 401-02.
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ridicule by male participants. 243 Even with multiple parties, the par-
ties may be so like-minded that they do not provide the public with a
genuine choice in philosophy. 244 And even in States that do not give a
single party a monopoly, legislated rules on party formation, requir-
ing, for example, a certain number of signatures to get a party on the
ballot, may inhibit the formation of new parties. 245
However, the opening of African governance systems to political
parties must be viewed as an advance for democracy. It is difficult to
open the political process to parties without at the same time broaden-
ing the rights of community-based groups. Opposition parties can
press the government to extend rights being denied by the government
of the party in power. Although it does not ensure democracy, a mul-
tiparty system eliminates one impediment to the propagation of polit-
ical views. The fact that it may not bring differing perspectives to bear
on public issues in a particular State is not a justification for sup-
pressing parties. The one-party approach is difficult to square with
freedom of association. If freedom of association has any meaning, it
is that citizens are free to form organizations to influence the political
life of the State.
If the international standard is not met by the one-party system as
it has functioned in Tanzania, still, it remains awkward from the Eu-
ropean standpoint to enforce in Africa a standard that Europe did not
apply when it controlled Africa. The political orders created by the
European colonizing powers in Africa would be called apartheid by
today's standards.
Nonetheless, a universal standard is probably appropriate. While
some Africans argue that it is improper to impose European-derived
standards on Africa, others welcome the assessment, saying it is
Europeans who think that Africa "cannot be judged on the basis of
any universal matrix. ' 246 Despite the colonial history and the Euro-
pean origin of human rights norms, the African States have affirmed
those standards, as in the Tanzanian Constitution and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
The issue of political participation involves not only a question of
the right to participate in government, but implicates all other rights
243. Lynda A. Ewen, Political Seminar Lacked Women Participation, DAILY NEWS (Dar es
Salaam), Aug. 10, 1990, at 4.
244. Mubako, supra note 20, at 82.
245. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) ("New parties struggling for their
place must have the time and opportunity to organize in order to meet reasonable requirements
for ballot position, just as the old parties have had in the past.").
246. Nyong'o, supra note 108.
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as well. If a State is governed in such a way that the rulers are not
subject to peaceful removal through the political process, it is unlikely
that they will protect human rights in general. Rather, they will resort
to measures that violate rights in order to suppress political opposition
that cannot make itself heard through channels that are lawful under
the domestic legal system.
VII. THE ROLE OF AID-GIVING STATES
Should the West encourage multiparty rule in Africa, or should it
adopt a hands-off approach? As mentioned above, the leaders of
Tanzania reacted negatively to Western suggestions that they must
abandon one-party rule. If a Western State encourages the abandon-
ment of one-party rule, does that constitute interference in the polit-
ical order, particularly if it conditions aid or loans on the switch? If in
a particular State a one-party system operates in a way that deprives
the citizenry of its rights of association, or participation in govern-
ment, should an aid-giving State concern itself with that fact, or, in-
deed, is it legally obligated to do so?
The appropriate policy for Western States must turn on the inter-
national standards regarding political parties, and on the rules gov-
erning aid-giving States when the recipient State violates human
rights. While the issue has not received much attention from human
rights enforcement agencies, it would seem that a State does have an
obligation not to provide aid that facilitates human rights violations.
The United States recognizes this obligation through legislation that
calls for a curtailment of aid to States whose governments engage in "a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights, ' 247 and annual State Department reports to Congress
on the status of human rights in States receiving U.S. aid.248
One would have a clear case where a State provides training or
equipment for torture of detainees as part of an assistance program.
The International Law Commission, in its draft articles on State re-
sponsibility, finds it unlawful to give material assistance that promotes
a violation of international law by another State. 249 Since torture is
internationally unlawful, the provision of training or equipment for
247. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1990) (Human Rights and Security Assistance); 22 U.S.C. § 2151
(1990) (Human Rights and Development Assistance).
248. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES (annual).
249. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR,
33rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 196, U.N. Doc. A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM. 80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 (pt. 2).
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use in torture would be unlawful as well.2 50
In the torture example, aid is related to a particular human rights
violation. Where, however, a State gives general economic aid to an-
other, and the recipient State violates human rights, the matter is more
complex. Few States engage in no human rights violations. If aid to
rights violators were prohibited, there would be no aid. Moreover, an
aid-giving State cannot be deemed responsible for any and all rights
violations by the recipient State, as that would expand liability to the
point of imposing unreasonable demands on aid-giving States. Aid-
giving States, consistent with principles of international responsibility,
are liable for giving aid to rights violators only where the aid facilitates
the violation, and where the aid-giving State is aware of the violation
at the time it gives the aid.251
Whereas torture is a violation that can be clearly established, un-
democratic forms of governance are more difficult to assess legally be-
cause democracy is a matter of degree. In the absence of a body of
human rights case law defining breaches in this area, it is not readily
ascertainable whether a particular State permits enough political par-
ticipation to satisfy international standards.
The State practice on termination of economic aid that is not spe-
cifically connected to a particular violation suggests that a termination
is required only where the violations by the recipient State are substan-
tial. A number of aid-giving States, for example, stopped their eco-
nomic aid to Chile because of the significant violation of rights that
accompanied the 1973 overthrow of Chile's civilian government and
the establishment of military rule there.252 The cited U.S. legislation
requires aid termination only for "a consistent pattern of gross
violations." 253
The issue of the legality of giving aid to a government that violates
human rights has typically arisen in the context of a particular policy,
such as torture or arbitrary arrest, that does not go to the heart of the
political system of the recipient State. The political party issue, on the
other hand, is intimately connected to the system of governance.
Thus, external pressure for change calls into question a fundamental
aspect of the political order of the recipient State.
Therefore, there is more reason for concern about inappropriate
250. John Quigley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in the Law of State
Responsibility, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77, 92 (1986).
251. Id. at 108-14.
252. Antonio Cassese, Foreign Economic Assistance and Respect for Civil and Political Rights.
Chile - A Case Study, 14 TEX. INT'L L.J. 251 (1979).
253. See supra note 247.
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interference into the domestic affairs of the recipient State. As indi-
cated above, Tanzanian leaders have reacted negatively, for precisely
this reason, to Western suggestions that pluralism is a precondition for
economic aid.25 4 At the same time, some multiparty proponents in
Tanzania welcomed the external pressure, because they thought it
might help win their objective. 255 They accused the leaders of using
the external pressure argument as an excuse to avoid domestic de-
mands for reform. 256
The newfound concern on the part of aid-giving States, and the
United States in particular, about the representative character of Afri-
can governments is a result of the end of the Cold War.257 So long as
the major U.S. concern in Africa was a State's adherence to the West-
ern camp, it put little pressure on the recipient States. 25 8 The United
States refrained from criticism because it did not want to depict the
States that sided with it as authoritarian. 259 When the Cold War
ended, however, this concern evaporated and the United States criti-
cized more freely and made the promotion of pluralism a central fea-
ture of its Africa policy. 26°
One African analyst, while urging greater democratization, ex-
pressed concern over Western motives:
Today with the prospect of countries following the socialist path dimin-
ishing, the West may not really be committed to the flowering of liberal
democracy in the Third World except for ideological reasons, that is so
as to show the West is asserting pressure the world over for adoption of
liberal democracy and not merely on Eastern Europe and other socialist
countries. 26 1
If this is true, the Western interest in democracy in Africa may be a
passing phase.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 162-63.
255. Dissolve Union Cabinet - Seminar, supra note 118, at 5 (reporting a resolution adopted
by 800 persons at a public meeting calling on countries giving development aid to extend it only
to countries that believed that "true democracy is brought by the existence of many parties").
256. Fundikira Invited Nyerere to Side with Multi-Party Democracy, supra note 174, at 4.
257. Dowden, supra note 134, at 10.
258. See Kibwana, supra note 16, at 37 ("The West preferred authoritarianism to social-
ism."); Alain Moyrand, Reflexions sur l'introduction de l'dtat de droit en Afrique noire
francophone, 3 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 251, 259-260 (1991) (making this point as regards
Western European aid-giving States, in particular, France).
259. Johns, supra note 133, at 4 (characterizing "the old African policy" as "focused heavily
on assisting dictatorships primarily because they were anti-Soviet").
260. Richard Joseph, Glasnost for Africa?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1989, at A21 (calling for use
of aid to force openness in authoritarian African regimes: "with the winding down of the cold
war, there is less reason for the U.S. to continue its unconditional support of repressive regimes
in Africa"); Kibwana, supra note 16, at 34; see also Cheryl I. Harris, The Impact of the End of the
Cold War on Africa, 48 NAT'L LAW. GUILD PRAC. 101 (1991).
261. Kibwana, supra note 16, at 37.
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The Western pressure for party pluralism was coupled with an ef-
fort to draw African States more closely into the Western economic
orbit, by permitting investment on more favorable terms, and granting
easier access to Western products. 262 Thus, there may be an element
of self-interest in the pressure on African States to move to party plu-
ralism. Herman Cohen, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for African
Affairs, linked the two as he threatened to withhold aid from countries
not following political pluralism:
We are making clear the link between political and economic liberaliza-
tion and outside assistance. We will help countries pursue a democratic
course and those already with democratic systems. In an era of escalat-
ing demand for scarce resources, we cannot waste nonhumanitarian
assistance on governments which themselves refuse the path to democ-
racy, and we will not do so. 2 6 3
A related concern is that if the Western States view themselves as
having a legitimate role in ensuring democracy in Third World States,
they might intervene militarily to overthrow offending governments.
There were instances of European military intervention in Africa even
after independence; as recently as 1989, the United States intervened
to overthrow a government in Panama, giving as one among several
justifications that the Panamanian government suppressed democ-
racy.264 Western concern about human rights might provide a pretext
for interventions undertaken for other reasons. When the United
States proposed in the U.N. General Assembly that the United Na-
tions monitor elections in various countries to ensure fair processes, a
number of Third World States objected that this might result in an
interference in their internal affairs. 265
At a British Commonwealth meeting in 1991, the British and Ca-
nadian governments indicated that they would not aid countries re-
jecting political pluralism. Malaysia's prime minister reacted, "The
Western world can't judge everyone by their standards. Who decides
a country is democratic - a donor nation?" 266
The problems of universality and neocolonialism notwithstanding,
262. Johns, supra note 133, at 5, 14 (proposing using economic aid to improve human rights,
saying this would "advance Washington's interests of bringing Africa... into the growing com-
munity of democratic, free market nations"; proposing also a radio station aimed at Africa on the
order of Radio Marti or Radio Free Europe).
263. Herman J. Cohen, Africa: Revolutionary Change and Democratization, FOREIGN POL'Y
BULL., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 24.
264. John Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama, 15 YALE J. INT'L
L. 276, 303-06 (1990).
265. Mikhail Kochetkov, UN General Assembly Adopts 20 Resolutions on Human Rights,
TASS, Dec. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File.
266. Cris Chinaka, Riot Police Seal Off Protests at Commonwealth Summit, Reuter Library
Report, Oct. 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
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it would seem that an aid-giving State is entitled, even required, to
consider the political party issue. Since all States commit some human
rights violations, only where those violations reach a certain magni-
tude will an aid-giving State be in jeopardy of complicity in the viola-
tion. Thus, while a one-party system as it functions in a particular
State might be sufficiently open to accommodate a wide range of
views, it might still violate freedom of association by forbidding other
parties. However, in such a case the seriousness of the violation would
be insufficient to render the aid-giving State complicit. On the other
hand, where elements of democracy are wholly lacking, the aid-giving
State would be complicit.
CONCLUSION
In Tanzania, the one-year debate led to a decision to move to a
multiparty system. During 1991, more African countries headed in
that direction, and increasingly Tanzania has become "odd man out."
The presidential commission, in a preliminary report to President
Mwinyi that had not yet been made public, concluded in favor of mul-
tiparty politics. In January 1992, the CCM National Executive Com-
mittee voted to hold a special CCM national conference to chart the
way to a multiparty system. The CCM resolution stipulated that par-
ties should be national in scope rather than mainland-based or Zanzi-
bar-based and also said that they should not be parties that "divide the
people along tribal, religious, regional or racial lines." However, it
was not clear how the formation of parties so based might be
avoided.267
The movement for political pluralism that began in Africa in 1990
presents the opportunity to make African governments more respon-
sive to public wishes, and less heavy-handed towards political oppo-
nents. Reforms are bringing African States into closer conformity
with human rights standards on political freedom. In Tanzania, the
one-party system has permitted the expression of opinion on public
issues but has restricted opposition in significant ways. The factors
that were cited in the 1960s as reasons for a one-party system, if they
were valid then, were less valid in the 1990s.
For Tanzania, as for Africa in general, political pluralism brings
the danger of divisiveness along the lines of nationality or religion. On
the other hand, the desire for pluralism is sufficiently strong that it
267. Tanzania CCM Leaders Recommend Introduction of Multipartyism, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Jan. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File (resolution
stating "that, at the end of the dialogue, the Presidential Commission presented to him (President
Mwinyi] a report proposing that a multi-party system be introduced in Tanzania").
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may be impossible to curb. Despite the dangers, political pluralism is
a needed corrective that holds the potential for more meaningful citi-
zen participation in government.
With regard to aid, African States are in great need of economic
assistance. Taking into account the prohibition against facilitating
human rights violations, aid-giving States should make every effort to
work with African governments to ensure a flow of aid.
